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The largest section of the volume then develops in fine
detail Quong’s argument for a minimal political liberal-
ism based upon his internal conception. Most interesting
are the chapters where he deviates significantly from Rawls’s
work.
Pace Rawls, in Chapter 6 Quong argues that the “com-
mon view” of the overlapping consensus has wrongly posi-
tioned it as a second justificatory step that any notion of
political justice must pass. For instance, the free-standing
argument for political liberalism, which Rawls developed
through the thought experiment of the original position,
must be justified by an overlapping consensus, where it
must be found congruent with our radically different com-
prehensive doctrines about the good life. Quong argues,
though, that if our comprehensive doctrines are all com-
patible with political liberalism, the overlapping consen-
sus is superfluous. If political liberalism is not compatible,
then in our drive for consensus, we would reject some of
the basic tenets of political liberalism. The author addresses
this dilemma by repositioning the overlapping consensus
to the first step of his argument. For him, the overlapping
consensus is an agreement about the fundamental tenets
of liberalism (that we are free and equal, committed to
general fairness, and accept the burdens of justice). If any
comprehensive doctrine does not accept these tenets, it is
branded as unreasonable. In this way, the fundamental
tenets of liberal society serve as starting points for delib-
eration among diverse conceptions of justice.
This argument leads to the very common asymmetry
objection of political liberalism discussed in Chapter 7.
Why should political liberalism treat disagreements about
the good life and disagreements about justice differently?
Quong argues that disagreements about the good life are
almost invariably “foundational disagreements” about first
principles, whereas disagreements about justice are almost
always “justificatory disagreements” whereby we draw dif-
fering conclusions starting from the same first principles.
The original, neutral principles upon which Quong bases
his modest political liberalism remain, even if differing
conceptions of justice emerge. He argues that only such
an internal conception of political liberalism is capable of
rebutting this asymmetry objection successfully.
While Rawls held that public reason—the idea that
political decisions must be based upon reasons consid-
ered valid by all citizens—should be applicable only to
questions of constitutional essentials and questions of
fundamental justice, Quong extends the public-reason
requirement to all political decisions. Though admitting
that such justifications might not always be possible, he
asks of Rawls, “[W]hy are all instances where citizens
exercise political power over one another not subject to
the idea of public reason?” (p. 274).
Overall, Quong’s work is well argued. He patiently clar-
ifies his assumptions, systematically develops his argu-
ments, gives a fair hearing to critics of political liberalism,
and anticipates many of the objections to his positions.
The work is well referenced and thus provides an excellent
overview of the main debates and literature in political
liberalism. It could serve as a required book for courses in
liberalism or even global justice. In more general political
theory courses, an instructor could require a chapter or
two next to texts by Rawls and Raz in order to show how
to engage spiritedly and honestly with such texts. In more
specialized courses, a useful comparison could be made
with Martha Nussbaum’s recent lengthy article that covers
the same ground but provides a more robust account of
political liberalism with a focus on respect (“Perfectionist
Liberalism and Political Liberalism,” Philosophy & Public
Affairs 39 [no. 1, 2011]: 3–45), or Steven Leece’s Against
Perfectionism: Defending Liberal Neutrality (2008), which
advances similar critiques of Raz’s perfectionism but pro-
vides the historical background to these debates and
expands on their policy implications.
Most readers of Quong’s work who are already conver-
sant in debates between political liberal thinkers such as
Rawls and Charles Larmore, on the one hand, and liberal
perfectionists like Raz and Isaiah Berlin, on the other, will
find his detailed, nuanced arguments quite provocative.
For those readers outside of, or unfamiliar with, the debates
in analytical political philosophy, this contest could appear
as an internecine battle founded on what Freud called a
“narcissism of small differences,” especially as the philos-
ophies of the two protagonists, Rawls and Raz, keep threat-
ening to collapse on each other. Numerous scholars have
claimed that Rawls advocates a type of minimal perfec-
tionism, and most perfectionist thinkers, such as Raz, offer
a tempered or moderate view of perfectionism. Those
expecting to find responses to the vexing justificatory prob-
lems of political liberalism, such as whether the basic struc-
ture masks injustice, will be disappointed, as Quong
intentionally eschews such questions.
A more robust concluding chapter that discusses the
implications of Quong’s arguments would have been help-
ful. If the best defense of political liberalism is an overlap-
ping consensus of such minimal propositions and an
unrealistic prohibition on states refraining from judg-
ments about the good life, what has become of the Rawls-
ian project? In addition, are the resulting founding
principles so minimal that they fail to ensure stability, one
of the primary goals of Rawls’s thought?
Law, Justice, Democracy, and the Clash of Cultures:
A Pluralist Account. By Michel Rosenfeld. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2011. 332p. $99.00 cloth, $36.99 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592712002125
— Nenad Stojanovic, University of Zurich
Increasingly, political and opinion leaders in Western soci-
eties are becoming suspicious of otherness and have ques-
tioned the need to accommodate cultural groups within
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their polities. In past years, for example, German Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel, British Prime Minister David Cam-
eron, and French President François Sarkozy all denounced
“multiculturalist” policies that had allegedly paved the way
for extremism, especially within the Muslim community.
To students of multiculturalism, these declarations may
sound not only embarrassingly superficial but also para-
doxical, given the very different approaches to cultural
diversity adopted in the respective countries. Yet such state-
ments often have a considerable impact on public opin-
ion. Any serious piece of scholarship addressing issues of
cultural diversity, I believe, ought to take them into account
and clarify the terms of the dispute.
Supported by excellent theoretical insights and the fin-
est analytical methods, such a clarification can be found
in Michel Rosenfeld’s new book. It is a significant contri-
bution to our understanding of the struggles over accom-
modation of cultural diversity in the contemporary world.
Written by a legal, moral, and political philosopher, this
book will be particularly useful to political scientists inter-
ested in questions relating to culture, identity, tolerance,
and democracy.
The core theme of the book is Rosenfeld’s passionate
defense of “comprehensive pluralism” (CP), a normative
theory on which he has been working for years (e.g., see
Just Interpretations, 1998). Rosenfeld develops his argu-
ment by discussing a variety of key authors, including
Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, John Rawls, Jacques Derrida, Jür-
gen Habermas, and Ronald Dworkin. He claims that in
polities that are “pluralistic-in fact,” because they com-
prise various competing conceptions of the good, CP offers
“the best available alternative for settling questions of jus-
tice, morals, ethics, and legitimacy” (p. 11). Indeed, Rosen-
feld considers CP a better alternative to the main monistic
theories (such as liberalism, republicanism, and commu-
nitarianism), as well as to postmodern relativism. But he
also considers it superior to competing pluralist accounts,
such as Isaiah Berlin’s “value pluralism” (pp. 37–42). Its
ultimate goal is to provide equal accommodation to all
competing conceptions of the good.
CP is a teleological, rather than a deontological, theory,
which—in contrast to Rawls’s Political Liberalism (1993)—
does not exclude fundamentalist religions, “as it com-
mands that efforts be made to ‘feel’ and understand such
religion[s] from ‘within’” (p. 65). For many readers, this
aspect of CP may be particularly disturbing. Does CP
posit that we should tolerate the intolerants and run the
risk, as Karl Popper warned us, that eventually the latter
take over and put an end to tolerance? Rosenfeld’s answer
is a qualified “no.” Indeed, he states that CP fully justifies
imposing its conception of the good “on everyone, includ-
ing proponents of religious fundamentalism” (p. 65). This
position is embodied in the so-called second-order norms,
a key feature of CP, meant to allow peaceful coexistence of
different and competing conceptions of the good. As a
consequence, CP “prescribes intolerance, in whole or in
part, of crusading religions and of non-religious ideolo-
gies bent on eradicating competing conceptions of the
good” (p. 146). However, even the holders of such views
might be tolerated for strategic reasons (i.e., if combating
them brings more harm than good), provided they are
numerically small and spatially isolated, and their actions
are not likely to produce a dissolution of the established
democratic pluralist order. A telling example would be the
neo-Nazis in the United States (p. 240).
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Rosen-
feld does not condemn per se cultural practices such as
female circumcision, provided the women are fully adult
and embrace it voluntarily (p. 118). Nevertheless, he wel-
comes the bans that originate from within a given com-
munity. For instance, he states openly that we should
applaud the Senegalese women who persuaded their
national parliament to outlaw female circumcision
(pp. 118, 120).
It is a positive feature of this book that it constantly
illustrates the possible implications of its normative theory
for real-world politics. Yet politicians involved in drafting
a law or political scientists focused on constitutional design
might find it difficult to use the precepts of CP in their
work. Rosenfeld’s normative framework, as I see it, is too
vague in this respect because the answers to many difficult
issues typically “depend on the circumstances” (p. 217).
Should we tolerate hate speech and antidemocratic polit-
ical parties (pp. 239–43)? It depends. In “ordinary times”
we should tolerate them for strategic reasons, but in “times
of stress” they should be outlawed, for “tolerance of the
intolerant may pave the way to times of crisis” (e.g., war).
Should we discourage ethnic parties (pp. 235–36)? Prob-
ably yes, if ethnic differences are “sharp and intense,” prob-
ably not if we want to ensure representation of a small
ethnic minority.
The main difficulty of this approach, I think, is that it
is not easy to decide whether the times are ordinary or
stressful, whether the ethnic divisions are sharp or blurred,
and so on. Ultimately, it seems to me that the crucial
judgment concerning the tolerability of given ideologies
depends on future developments, which are difficult or
impossible to predict. This is exemplified by the case of
the Islamic party Refah, banned by the Turkish Constitu-
tional Court. Rosenfeld claims that the dissolution of this
party would be justified only if it were “genuinely likely
eventually to culminate in dissolution of the Turkish pol-
ity” (p. 243). Now, what is “genuinely likely” to happen is
a matter of dispute on which it is hard to reach a consensus.
Finally, I found myself puzzled by the question con-
cerning how CP should treat declared preferences of vari-
ous actors (e.g., religious leaders, ethnic entrepreneurs,
etc.) who claim to speak in the name of a given concep-
tion of the good. As I read it, CP presupposes a good
degree of sincerity here. Such actors ought to openly
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disclose their internal values (i.e., “first-order norms”), so
that CP can analyze them and see if their implementation
is compatible with its own second-order norms. Yet it is
well known that social actors, especially politicians, tend to
disguise their real motives. Some believe that it is even a core
imperative for any politician to be “a great pretender and
dissembler [gran simulatore e dissimulatore],” for he will
always find someone “who will allow himself to be deceived”
(Machiavelli, The Prince, Chap. 18). So how should we
treat ethnic entrepreneurs who, in departure, speak of
peace and harmony but, once in power, engage in ethnic
cleansing? In other words, it seems to me that CP is well
suited to judge ex post whether a particular conception of
the good should have been fought because it proved to be
intolerant (e.g., Nazism), but it risks being too benign ex
ante. Indeed, it is a tragic feature of recent human history
that Hitler was quite successful in disguising his real inten-
tions, with the result that the leaders of democratic coun-
tries kept accommodating and tolerating his murderous
“conception of the good” until the very outbreak of the war.
Horace Mann’s Troubling Legacy: The Education of
Democratic Citizens. By Bob Pepperman Taylor. Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2010. 192p. $34.95.
doi:10.1017/S1537592712002137
— Sidney Plotkin, Vassar College
Horace Mann is best known, of course, for advancing pub-
lic education as a foundation stone of American democ-
racy, not as a democratic theorist. But Bob PeppermanTaylor
makes clear in this valuable and well-written new study that
Mann’s efforts on behalf of public education were tied to a
dim view of democratic citizens. Education must elevate
them or democracy would perish, Mann insisted. Echoes
of these ideas continue to animate contemporary discus-
sions of civic education, and not for the better.
For Taylor, Mann’s “troubling legacy” reflects his skep-
ticism of Madisonian politics as a response to the unruli-
ness of citizens, people driven by passion, ego, and interest.
The Framers set up the Constitution to organize, moder-
ate, and limit what they foresaw as the inevitable conflicts
dividing a fractured and parochial citizenry: so far, so good.
But these arrangements were insufficient to the demo-
cratic dangers ahead. Unless common schoolteachers taught
citizens to embrace a unifying moral purpose, Mann
warned, Americans would become trapped in a down-
ward spiral of corrupting passions and conflicting inter-
ests, especially so as the nation could no longer count on
its once-strong Puritan tradition to contain its conten-
tious pluralism. Political institutions alone could not rem-
edy the defects of untamed citizens; the character of those
citizens had to be suitably guided and bent toward a sub-
stantive moral consensus. Democracy, in short, requires
more than well-designed institutions; it needs a particular
kind of public education, a political schooling “to make
citizens worthy of the political respect we seem to owe
them in the first place” (p. 7). Only then could American
democracy advance beyond the discordant, corrosive pol-
itics of rival factions and parties.
Given the deepening embitterment of antebellum Amer-
ica, Mann’s political anxiety is more than a little under-
standable. Taylor might have made this point; the looming
national divide over slavery goes unmentioned in his study.
But he is certainly right to emphasize that Mann’s educa-
tional project could not have been more political in its
antipolitical animus. His “program of civic education”
promised “to dissolve political disputes,” inspiring a “polit-
ical life without any significant controversy at all” (p. 14).
Yet even as Mann despaired over the prospects of a polit-
ical system geared only to managing conflict, he was deeply
optimistic about the educability of citizens and their trained
capacity to rise above discord.
Such optimism was rooted, as it often is, in a mis-
guided faith in the capacity of science to transcend poli-
tics. Thus, Taylor shows how Mann’s hopes were anchored
to the work of George Combs, an influential mid-
nineteenth-century phrenologist. Combs believed that
human brains harbor capacities to grasp the universal
laws of physical and human nature, including moral and
intellectual laws. Although we may observe these laws
independently, we achieve true well-being when we learn
to obey them together, as God intended. Thus, educa-
tion could help us to realize our highest moral capacity.
Mann’s faith in the redemptive qualities of public educa-
tion was embedded in Comb’s physical and moral psy-
chology. He wanted public schools to tap and develop
students’ innate moral judgment and thus to fashion a
citizenry able to resist poisonous conflict.
Crucial to this project, and to Taylor’s critique of it, was
Mann’s insistence that teachers privilege moral over intel-
lectual education. Guided by his misplaced faith in the pos-
sibilities of political harmony, Mann emphasized, in his
educationalphilosophy, the instrumental, functional, indeed
quite political role of education in smoothing the tensions
of the political system. He aimed to realize an impossible
dream, a utopia of nonadversarial politics. In essence, Mann
conceived of education and students not as ends in them-
selves but as political means to a higher moral purpose, a
purpose that he never actually defined, nor could he.
For Taylor, Mann’s teaching to the avoidance of conflict
represented a profound disservice to students. It prepared
them neither for the aggressiveness of political conflict
nor for the informed capacity to make up their own minds
about political controversy. His design for teaching impeded
their exposure to uncertainty, ambiguity, skepticism, and
doubt, the epistemological conditions of democracy as it
really exists. Experiencing the ambiguities of great litera-
ture and the skeptical habits of the scientific mind, Taylor
argues, is essential to the growth of mature citizens, peo-
ple able not only to tolerate difference but to form their
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